Select Publications

6. Kulesa, Ryan and Alberto Giubilini. 2024. “Conscientious Refusal or Conscientious Provision: We Can’t have Both.” Bioethics 38: 445-451. pdf

5. Kulesa, Ryan. 2024. “The Doing/Allowing Distinction in the Divine Context.” Religious Studies 60(2): 302-312. pdf

4. Kulesa, Ryan. 2023. “The Counterfactual Argument Against Abortion.” Utilitas 35(3): 218-228. pdf

3.   Kulesa, Ryan. “Kantian Conscientious Objection: A reply to Kennett.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (forthcoming). pdf 

2. Kulesa, Ryan. 2022. “A Defense of Conscientious Objection: Why Health is Integral to the Permissibility of Medical Refusals.” Bioethics 36(1): 54-62. pdf

1. Kulesa, Ryan. 2021. “Preemption and a Counterfactual Analysis of Divine Causation.”International Journal for Philosophy of Religion89(2): 125-134. pdf

Work in Progress

(Title Omitted - Under Review)

I argue that gradualists about moral status should defend the idea that differences in status-relevant properties are disproportional to differences in status.

(Title Omitted - Under Review)

Here, I argue that the conditional probability that an individual will have some advanced cognitive capacities is relevant to one’s moral status.

(Title Omitted - Under Review)

The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests is false, I argue, because it fails to take into account how well one’s life is going overall for that individual.

“Reliable Moral Intuitions”

I argue that some intuitions are more reliable than others – that is, we can be more confident that their propositional content is true.

“Infidelity and the Casual View of Sex” with Derek Estes

In this paper, we argue that the casual view of sex cannot explain why sexual infidelity is worse than other kinds of promise breaking.